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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Respondent Dr. Marano agrees that this is a medical malpractice case. It is on appeal
following Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the trial court's scheduling order.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

The Leppers filed their Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on October 26,
2012. R. Vol. 1, p. 33-44 (approved through Court Order on October 30, 2012 R. Vol. 1, p.45).
Through that Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, the Leppers alleged that Dr.
Marano and Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center ("EIRMC") breached the "standard of care"
at "the time and place of the alleged negligence." R. Vol. 1, p, 38 and 40. 1
On November 27, 2012, Dr. Marano served discovery on the Leppers, and Interrogatory
No. 9 modeled on l.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) which asked for the Leppers· expert witnesses and a:
complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons
therefore, the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the
opinions ... to allow Defendant to obtain information relating to that testimony.
R. Vol. 2, pp. 168 T-U.
On December 27, 2012, the Leppers answered Interrogatory Number 9 as follows:
No decision has been made as to the use of any expert witness in this matter.
When or if such a determination is made, such information will be seasonably
supplied to Defendant's counsel in accordance with all pre-trial orders.
Thus, for exactly one year (if not more) before the matters that give rise to this Appeal, the
Leppers had alleged that the Defendants' care breached standards applicable to the Defendants in
the community ordinarily served by EIRMC.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 1

R. Vol. 1, p. 168 Z (emphasis added).
The trial com1 issued its scheduling order on January 18, 2013. R. Vol. L p. 89. The
scheduling order required that the Leppers' expert witness disclosure "including opinions and
conclusions,, be filed at least 100 days before trial. Id. The scheduling order required Defendants
to file objections to Plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure within 20 days of the Plaintiffs' disclosure
deadline or waive any objections. Id.
The parties stipulated to amend the scheduling order, and on February 22, 2013 the trial
court issued an order granting the stipulation. R. Vol. 1, pp. 93A, 93. The parties stipulated to
modify the Leppers' required expert witness disclosure deadline to October 30. Id. at 93A, 93B.
The Defendants' deadline to object to the Leppers' disclosures within 20 days remained. Id.
At no time during the course of the proceedings in the trial court, and prior to the October
30, 2103 deadline, despite what the Leppers' attorneys would set out were understandably tough
times faced by these attorneys, did the Leppers ever ask for: 1) a new trial setting or new deadlines;
2) clarification of the court's scheduling order with respect to what the court required in the
parties' disclosures; or 3) relief from part or all of the required disclosures via an extension, from
any counsel or the court.
The Leppers filed their expert witness disclosure on October 30, 2013. R. Vol. L p. 159.
This document set out that the disclosure constituted "plaintiffs' good faith effort to identify those
experts who are expected to testify ... " and further that "IRCP 26 disclosures regarding Dr.
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DeLong's testimony are being contemporaneouslv provided to counsel through discovery
supplementation.'' R. Vol. 1, pp. 159 and 161 (emphasis added).
The entirety of the Leppers' actual disclosure of Dr. DeLong to the court which was
required, consisted of one and three quarters pages. R. Vol. l, p. 160-161. Nowhere in that
disclosure did the Leppers maintain that Dr. DeLong has any opinions or conclusions. Id.
Nowhere in that disclosure did the Leppers set out that what Dr. De Long would testify to was with
'·reasonable medical certainty,'' as is required in Idaho Code § 6-1013.
Through the Leppers' actual disclosure, they maintained that Dr. Delong would testify
based only on ''his review of Charles Leppcrs' medical records from Eastern Idaho Regional
Medical Center (EIRMC); the MRI reports as well as the images themselves; and the depositions
of the three nurses and the associated exhibits, as well as a number of peer reviewed medical
journal articles and a book on arachnoiditis." R. Vol. 1, p. 160.
The Leppers served supplemental discovery responses via hand delivery to counsel,
only, on October 29, 2013. R. Vol. 1, p. 165. Included in the supplemental disclosures was a
new answer to Dr. Marano' s Interrogatory Number 9, with an enclosed report and curriculum vitae
from Dr. DcLong. R. Vol.l, p. 168 GGGG.
It appears that this report and curriculum vitae were not provided to the court, until filed
with Dr. Marano's Counsel's Affidavit in Support of Motion in Limine to Strike and Exclude
Plaintiffs' Experis, which was filed by mail on November 14, 2013. R. Vol. 2, pp. 168N 168CCCC.

Additionally, the Leppers took the position, through later filed Responses and
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Objections to Dr. Marano and EIRMC's Motions to Strike and Exclude. that the Defendants \Vere
seeking a '·discovery sanction.'· relative to the Leppers' discovery responses. R. Vol. 3. p 177-18
and 184-185.
It is assumed then, that the sum total of the "opinions and conclusions'' disclosed by Dr.
Delong and Nurse Arruda, pursuant to the Amended Scheduling Order are those on pages
160-162 of R. Vol. 1.
Regardless, nowhere, in any disclosure of witnesses or response to discovery, did the
Leppers, or their experts, Dr. Delong and Nurse Arruda, set out, maintain or declare that Dr.
Delong and Nurse Arruda had "actual knowledge'' of:
The applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which such
care allegedly was or should have been provided, as such standard existed at the
time and place of the alleged negligence of such physician and surgeon, hospital or
other such health care provider and as such standard then and there existed with
respect to the class of health care provider that such defendant then and there
belonged to and in which capacity he, she or it was functioning.
See Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013.
Pursuant to the court's scheduling order, Dr. Marano filed a Motion in Li mine to Strike and
Exclude Plaintiffs' expert witnesses Dr. Delong and Nurse Arruda based on their insufficient
expert witness disclosures and their failure to state opinions and conclusions based upon their
failure to declare that they had actual knowledge of the applicable standard of health care practice.
R. Vol. 2, p. 168A. Further, Dr. Marano filed an objection to Plaintiffs' expert disclosure. R. Vol.
3, p. 168 VVVVVVVVVVVV. Had these objections not been filed, they would have been waived.
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During the course of the December 3, 2013 hearing on Defendants· motions to exclude the
Leppers' expert witnesses, counsel for the Leppers advised the court that experts Arruda and Dr.
De Long were familiar with the applicable local standards of health care practice at issue in the case
and that the information merely had to be requested:
Now, I can represent to you as an officer of the Court that these people would not
give opinions that they weren't prepared foundationally to back up and do it
properly.
Hr'g Tr. 13:8-13:10, Dec. 3, 2013.
I guess the point that I'm making, Your Honor, is this: There are various ways that
an expert can become familiar. If they want to know. they can ask. And we're
willing to tell them. I mean, this isn ·ta hide the ball. This isn't a contest of cat and
mouse. We're willing to tell them.
Hr'g Tr. 18:20-24, Dec. 3, 2013.
On December 3, 2013, the court entered an order striking and excluding Dr. Delong and
Arruda. R. Vol. 3, p. 188. On that same day. Dr. Marano moved for relief from the scheduling
order so be could file a motion to dismiss. R. Vol. 3. p. 188 L.
The Leppers moved for reconsideration of the courf s December 3, 2013 Order striking and
excluding their experts. R. Vol. 3, pp. 192. They also moved to supplement their disclosures and
for an extension of the disclosure deadline. R. Vol. 3, p. 198. Two days later on December 5, 2013,
Dr. Marano filed a Motion to Dismiss. R. Vol. 3, p. 211 E.
Thereafter on December 5, 2013, the court ordered the following:
Plaintiffs shall have fourteen ( 14) days . . . to provide Defendants with
supplemental disclosures as to Arruda and Delong which disclosures are to
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identify ( 1) whether they are familiar with the local standard of care. and if so, hmv
they became familiar with the local standard of care. and (2) if not familiar with the
local standard of care, the basis by which their testimony would otherwise be
admissible under Idaho law.
R. Vol. 3, p. 206.
The Leppers did not move to reconsider the court's December 5, 2013 Order, despite
protests that the court's scheduling order requiring opinions and conclusions did not require
standard of health care practice opinions.
The court did not grant the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. R. Vol. 3, p. 204.
On December 18, 2013, the Leppers filed what they termed a supplemental disclosure of
their experts Arruda and Dr. Delong. R. Vol. 3, p.224. They attached Dr. DeLong's and Arruda's
original reports. which were served through discovery, only, as well as supplemental reports. Id.
On December 19, 2013, Defendant Dr. Marano joined EIRMC's Motion for
Reconsideration of the court's December 5, 2013 Order that required the Leppers to provide
adequate disclosures for Arruda and Dr. Delong within 14 days. R. Vol. 5, p. 734W.
On January 14. the court granted the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. R. Vol. 6, p.
767. The court stated that the scheduling order's purpose "was to preclude the various motions,
disputes and issues now arising from the Plaintiffs· inadequate disclosure of expe1i testimony.'' Id.
The court stated that "it should have enforced its scheduling order.'' Id. The court found that there
was no good basis for it to extend time for the Leppers' expe1is to become familiar with the
applicable standard of practice. Id. The court determined that it made a mistake in issuing the
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December 5 Order. Id. In holding that the scheduling order vvas clear and '·require[ d] a timely and
orderly disclosure of expert witnesses and their testimony to allow parties to properly prepare for
trial." the court found that the leppers had failed to establish good cause for Dr. Delong's and
Arruda' s failure to adequately familiarize themselves with the applicable standards of practice. Id.
The court further noted that this was not a case of an inadvertent failure of the Plaintiffs to disclose
how their experts came to have actual knowledge, rather '"a complete failure on the part of the
expe1i witnesses to familiarize themselves with the standard of care.'' R. Vol. 6, 768.
In the intervening period, the leppers' counsel sent letters to physicians in Idaho Falls and
elsewhere stating that counsel would assume that the recipients were unwilling to speak with Dr.
Delong if the recipient did not respond to the letter. Id. These letters were insufficient for the court
to find that there was good cause for Arruda and Dr. DeLong' s failure. Id. The court precluded the
Leppers' experts Dr. Delong and Arruda from testifying at trial and stated that "To the extent
Defendants believe this ruling is dispositive of the case, they may file a motion for summary
judgment." Id. at 770.
On January 21, 2014, the Defendants filed Motions for Summary Judgment. R. Vol. 6, pp.
775, 778. On the same day, the Leppers moved for reconsideration of the court's January 14, 2014
Order in which the court granted EIRMC's Motion for Reconsideration and precluded Dr. DeLong
and Arruda from testifying. R. Vol. 6, p. 789.
The comi entered an Order on January 21, 2014 in which it required that the Leppers file all
documents that they wanted to file in opposition to the Defendants' Motions for Summary
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 7

Judgment as well as any documents they wanted to file in support of any Motion for
Reconsideration. R. Vol. 6. p. 794. Thereafter. the Leppers filed a brief in support of their Motion
for Reconsideration. R. Vol. 6, p. 813. Attached to that brief were affidavits of Dr. Delong and
Arruda. Id. at 840,898. They also filed a brief in support of their objection to Defendants' Motions
for Summary Judgment. R. Vol. 7, p. 1187.
The court denied the leppers' Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment. R. Vol. 8, p. 1203. The court found that even if Arruda may
finally now have an opinion on the applicable standard of practice, this opinion does not remedy
her failure to timely disclose her testimony with the required local standard of practice element. R.
Vol. 8, p. 1205. Further, the court found that, in regard to Dr. Delong, even if the leppers believed
that the local standard of practice was indeterminable, the leppers still needed to have timely
disclosed Dr. Delong's opinions and conclusions along with the necessary foundation regarding a
similar Idaho community by October 30, 2013. Id. at 1206.
Thereafter, the court entered a final judgment on February 14, 2014. R. Vol. 8, p. 1210. The
leppers filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and the court denied it. Importantly, the court held:
Testimony that is precluded from trial cannot be used to preclude summary
judgment. To this extent Plaintiffs' recent affidavits attempting to establish
compliance with § 6-1012 will not be considered.
Where this Court has precluded the testimony of Delong and Arruda, and there is
no dispute that absent that testimony Plaintiffs cannot present a prima facia case of
malpractice against Defendants, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
R. Vol. 8, p. 1208.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 8

The leppers then filed a Notice for this appeal. R. Vol. 8, p. 1306.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The medical facts engendering this lawsuit are far more complicated than those set forth
under Section II. C of the Appellants' Brief. Moreover, the factual nature of the case is irrelevant to
this appeal.
II.

III.

ADDITIONAL AND/OR RESTATED ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

The District Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Granting Dr. Marano's
Motion in Limine to Strike and Exclude Dr. Delong and Nurse Arruda, as the
Court's Scheduling Order Required the Leppers to Disclose, by October 30, 2013,
that Dr. Delong and Nurse An-uda Had Actual Knowledge of the Standard of
Health Care Practice Applicable to Dr. Marano, and the leppers Failed to Do That.

2.

The District Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Granting the Defendants'
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's December 5, 2013 Order.

3.

The District Court Properly Granted Dr. Marano' s Motion for Summary Judgment.

4.

The District Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Denying the Leppers'
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's January 14, 2014 Order.

5.

The District Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Denying the leppers'
Motion for Reconsideration of the Final Judgment Entered on February 14, 2014.

6.

Even if Considered, the leppers' Serial Submissions Cannot be Read to Satisfy the
Statutory Requirements of Interminability under Idaho Code § 6-1012.

7.

Respondent Dr. Marano is Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-12 land Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

ARGUMENT

A.

The District Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Granting Dr.
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Marano's Motion in Limine to Strike and Exclude Dr. DeLong and Nurse
Arruda, as the Court's Scheduling Order Required the Leppers to Disclose,
by October 30, 2013, that Dr. DeLong and Nurse Arruda Had Actual
Knowledge of the Standard of Health Care Practice Applicable to Dr.
Marano, and the Leppers Failed to do That.

On December 3, 2013. the court struck and excluded Dr. De Long and Arruda because the
Leppers· disclosure as to these expert witnesses failed to declare that they had actual knowledge of
the applicable standard of health care practice and failed to state opinions and conclusions based
upon their actual knowledge of the applicable standard of health care practice. See R. Vol. 3. p.
188. As a result of this finding, the court determined that the Leppers· experts had no opinions and
could not make out aprimafacie case. Id; Hr'g Tr. 14-15, 23-24, Dec. 3, 2013.
The standard of review in reviewing a district court's order granting a motion in limine is
the abuse of discretion standard. See Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 25, 105
P.3d 676. 685 (2005). '·Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on a motion in limine." Id.
Further, a trial court can sanction a party for non-compliance with pretrial orders. Priest v.
Landon, 135 Idaho 898. 900. 26 P.3d 1235. 1237 (Ct. App. 2001 ). "The imposition of such

sanctions is committed to the discretion of the trial court. and we will not overturn such a decision
absent a manifest abuse of that discretion." Id.
To determine whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court must determine
whether the district court con-ectly perceived the issue as one of discretion; whether the district
court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion, consistent with applicable legal standards;
and whether the district court reached its decision by exercise of reason. See Gunter v. Mwplty 's
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Lounge, LLC. 141 Idaho 16. 23. I 05 P.3d 676,683 (2005). If there is not a clear showing of abuse.

the court's exercise of discretion should not be overturned. See Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc.
v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 768, 86 P.3d 475. 482 (2004).
1.

The District Court Correctly Perceived its Decision Whether to Grant
the Defendants' Motion in Liminc as a Discretionary One.

The court properly exercised its discretion in this matter. The district court recognized that
its decision on the Motion in Limine was discretionary. See R. Vol. 3, p. 188. The court made
clear that it appreciated what the "purpose of the [Scheduling] Order" was and that is "notice [as
to] what the expert's going to proffer at the time of trial, so [Defendants] can respond to that." Hr'g
Tr. 14:15-14:18. Dec. 3, 2013.
Further, in its oral ruling the court stated:
I frequently rule, when we get into issues and disputes about whether the disclosure
is even- creates the ability for this person to testify at the time of trial. And we've
talked about what's a prima facia case and what's not. And I don't think I'm
reinventing the wheel here because there's a lot of case law that governs expert
witnesses on medical malpractice claims ...

***
So, again. I think the case law is pretty clear and the statute is what it is. That
testimony is not relevant, it's not going to be allowed, and the testimony is
precluded.
Hr'g Tr. 23:24-25:20, Dec. 3, 2013 (emphasis added).
Further, in its written Order, the collli set out that the Leppers· disclosures had not set out
all testimony establishing the witnesses' ability to testify and found that Arruda and Dr. DeLong
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.. do not affirmatively show their knowledge of the standard of care, and how they came by that
knowledge:· R. Vol. 3. p. 189. 2
The trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, thereby satisfying the
first step of this Court's inquiry.

2.

The District Court Acted Within the Outer Boundaries of Its
Discretion and Consistently With Legal Standards.

The court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal
standards. See R. Vol. 3, p. 188; Hr'g Tr. 23:20-26:6. Dec. 3, 2013. Through the court's Order,
the court clearly applied the law to the application of its scheduling Order to the motions:
Plaintiffs' disclosures as to these expert witnesses do not include the elements
required by I.C. § 6-1012, i.e. knowledge of the local standard of care. Plaintiffs'
duty to disclose included the duty to disclose all testimony which would establish
the witness· competency to testify: "The party offering the evidence must also
affirmatively show that the witness is competent to testify about the matters stated
in his testimony." Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 156 P.3d 533 (2007). The
disclosures of Arruda and De Long do not affirmatively show their knowledge as to
the local standard of care, and how they came by that knowledge. As such, their
testimony as reflected in the record is irrelevant.
R. Vol. 3, pp.188-189.
The decision in Edmunds v. Kraner supports the court's decision to grant the Defendants'
Motion in Limine to strike Nurse Arruda and Dr. Delong. See Edmunds v. Kraner. 142 Idaho

2
Though the Leppers do not raise it, it should be pointed out that a trial court does not have
to expressly state that it recognizes a decision is discretionary for it to be so. See Van v. Portneuf
Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 560, 212 P.3d 982, 990 (2009) ("While the district comi did not
expressly state it recognized that its decision on Van's motion for reconsideration was
discretionary, the court nonetheless perceived the issue as such.").
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867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006).
An understanding of the facts in Edmunds is crucial to understanding the true holding of
that case. In Edmunds, Dr. Holland was one of the plaintiffs experts, and the court excluded one
of his affidavits as untimely. See Edmunds, 142 Idaho at 867, 136 P.3d at 338. Dr. Hollander's
name was initially disclosed by the disclosure deadline. Id., at 874,343. His name was all that was
required to be disclosed by the scheduling order in that case. Id. The plaintiffs therefore complied
with the scheduling order in that case as it relates to Dr. Hollander's disclosure. Id. After the
disclosure deadline had passed, Dr. Hollander filed two affidavits. Id. at 342-44, 871-73. The first
affidavit was filed in support of the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment, and in it Dr.
Hollander stated that he was "familiar with the local standard of care for 'all health care
providers."' Id. Further. he analyzed the hospital" s breach of the applicable standard. Id. The
second affidavit was filed in opposition to the hospital"s motion for summary judgment. Id. This
second affidavit contained the same opinions that were disclosed earlier by Dr. Hollander in his
first affidavit. Id. at 342, 871. The trial court struck the second affidavit as untimely. Id.
The court in Edmunds held that the lower court abused its discretion when it struck Dr.
Hollander's affidavit as being untimely under its discovery order and I.R.C.P. 26. Id. at 345-346;
874-875. The court found that the lower court erred in its belief that its brief scheduling order
superseded I.R.C.P. 26( e )(I )(B) which contemplates that expert testimony can change after the
initial disclosure deadline. See Edmunds, 142 Idaho at 874, 136 P.3d at 345. Since the scheduling
order in Edmunds only required the names of experts to be disclosed by the deadline, a later
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affidavit that included opinions and conclusions was not erroneous when the expert who submitted
that affidavit was already timely disclosed in accordance with that cou1i's scheduling order. Id.
Had the scheduling order in Edmunds required opinions and conclusions, the disclosure of only
Dr. Hollander's name by the deadline would have been a valid basis for the court to strike his
affidavit.
It is impmiant to recognize that the language in the scheduling order in Edmunds is quite
different than the language in the court's scheduling order at issue in this case. See Edmunds, 142
Idaho at 874, 136 P.3d at 345; R. Vol. 1, p. 89, 93A, 93. In Edmunds, the scheduling order simply
stated "Plaintiffs experts to be disclosed by April 14, 2003." Id. at 874,345.
Thus, only the expe1is' names, and nothing more, were all that the parties needed to
disclose in Edmunds in order to comply with that court's scheduling order. Id.

In the present

matter, the court's scheduling order required that "Plaintiff(s) expert witness disclosure, includinf{

opinions and conclusions must be filed at least 100 days before trial." R. Vol. 1, p. 89; R. Vol. 1, p.
93A, 93 (emphasis added). The amended scheduling order merely changes the due date of the
parties' expe11 witness disclosures. Id. at 93A, 93.

Edmunds v. I(raner supports the comi's decision to strike and exclude Dr. DeLong and
Nurse Arruda, as it requires that an expert first meet the foundational requirements set forth in J.C.

§ 6-1013 before the expert can even develop an opinion. Id. 867, 338.
Edmunds defines opinions as including the foundational requirements set forth in l.C. §
6-1013. Thus, Dr. Delong and Nurse Arruda could not have had an opinion until they became
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familiar with the applicable standard of health care practice. and a declaration of such was required
in their disclosure by the October 30. 2013 deadline.

Edmunds supports that ·'opinions and conclusions," as required by the scheduling order,
necessarily includes the required foundation for those opinions and conclusions. See Edmunds,
142 Idaho at 867, 136 P.3d at 338. The court referred to Dr. Hollander's '·opinion" throughout its
decision, and this "opinion" included Dr. Hollander's statement that he had become familiar with
the applicable standard of practice as well as his conclusions about the hospital's breach of that
standard. Id. at 343, 872. Dr. Hollander's opinion was described as follows:
[I]n support of the Edmunds motion for summary judgment, Dr. Hollander's
opinion was reduced to affidavit form. It stated the he had become familiar with the
local standard of care for ·'all health care providers." Additionally, this first
affidavit analyzed St. Alphonsus's breach using a multiple-daily dosing regime for
Gentamicin as the local standard. These opinions were disclosed prior to any
disclosure by St. Alphonsus.
Id.

The scheduling order in the instant case required the disclosure of Dr. Delong and Nurse
Arruda's "opinions and conclusions," and it follows that in order for them to have had an opinion,
they needed to have actual knowledge of the applicable standard of health care practice. Id. Their
statements and observations do not become opinions until they have become familiar with the
applicable standard of health care practice. Id. Since ·'opinions and conclusions" were required by
the disclosure, Dr. Delong was required to have declared that he had become familiar with the
standard of practice applicable to Dr. Marano, to have explained how he became familiar with that
standard, and to have disclosed his conclusions that were based on his actual knowledge of the
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applicable standard of practice. Id.
If opinions arc required to be disclosed, satisfying the foundational requirements for those
opinions is also required. Otherwise. scheduling orders pertaining to expert witness disclosures are
absurdities that are futile. There is absolutely no purpose in requiring the disclosure of opinions
and conclusions which do not need to have the proper foundation. There is no reason to require the
disclosure of purported opinions and conclusions which would not even be admissible at trial. 3
Moreover, considering that the court gave Defendants a certain number of days to object to the
Leppers' disclosure, there would be nothing to object to if the foundation were not a required
element of a party's '·opinions and conclusions." An expert cannot develop an opinion without first
gaining actual knowledge of the applicable standard of health care practice. Defendants cannot
respond to a disclosure if no prima facie case is made.

If an expert is unfamiliar with the

applicable standard of health care practice, it is impossible for him or her to develop an opinion of
a provider's compliance or breach of that standard of practice, and no responsive filing would need
to be made.

In order for an expert's observation or statement to rise to the level of an opinion. the

expert must first meet the foundational requirements.
The Leppers are not contending that Dr. DeLong had actual knowledge of the applicable
standard of health care practice by the October 30, 2013 disclosure deadline. Instead, the Leppers

3
"As a threshold matter, to be admissible in a medical malpractice action, expert testimony
must demonstrate the expert's familiarity with the applicable standard of care for a particular
profession for the relevant community and time, and the proponent must show the basis for the
expert's knowledge." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho at 874, 136 P.3d at 345.
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argue that they were not required under the court's scheduling order to disclose that Dr. Delong
had actual knowledge of the applicable standard of practice or to disclose his opinions and
conclusions based on that actual knowledge. The leppers do not explain what the purpose of the
20 day objection period is, why they did not move for an extension, why Defendants would or even
could file responsive disclosures based on the leppers' expert disclosures, or why they stipulated
to an amended scheduling order with the exact language as the first.
The leppers argue that they timely disclosed the opinions and conclusions of Dr. Delong
and Nurse Arruda by the October 30, 2013 disclosure deadline. Appellants' Br. 17. They contend
that the court erred in excluding their experts for failing to disclose the required foundational
requirements because the court's scheduling order did not explicitly require the foundation. Id. at
17, 18. To support this argument, the leppers rely upon Edmunds and erroneously contend that

Edmunds holds that a court cannot exclude an expert for failing to disclose the foundation unless a
scheduling order explicitly requires it. Id.
The court in Edmunds does not hold that scheduling orders must explicitly reqmre
foundation for opinions and conclusions before a comi can exclude an expert for failing to satisfy
the foundational requirements. Id. The court in Edmunds held that
While a court may properly order parties to disclose expert witnesses by a deadline,
a brief order dictating the date of disclosing only the names of expert witnesses
cannot trump the requirement of I.R.C.P. 26(e)(l)(B) that parties seasonably
supplement their discovery responses as new information is learned or expert
opinions change."

Id. at 875, 346.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 17

Thus. the district court in the instant matter did not err in excluding Arruda and Dr. De Long
simply because its scheduling order did not explicitly state that the foundation for the requisite
opinions and conclusions needed to be disclosed by the disclosure deadline. Edmunds stands for
the proposition that a scheduling order that simply states "·plaintiffs experts to be disclosed by .. .''
does not require anything more than the expe11s· names, and a court cannot exclude experts for a
party's failure to include anything more than the experts' names. Id. The scheduling order in the
instant case was more detailed and required opinions and conclusions which necessarily includes
the foundation for those opinions and conclusions.
The court acted within the boundaries of its discretion, consistent with the applicable legal
standards. The cou11 identified the reasoning behind its decision to grant the Motion in Limine. See
R. Vol. 3, p. 188: Hr·g Tr. 23:20-26:6, Dec. 3, 2014. At the hearing on the Motion, the court
explained that the purpose of the scheduling order is to disclose what the witness is going to testify
to at trial, and if the testimony exceeds what is contained in the disclosure. it will be precluded.
Hr·g Tr. 24:1-24:6. The court stated "part and parcel of the relevant testimony is disclosure as to
how that expert became familiar ... .'' Hr'g Tr. 25:5-7. The court stated that Nurse Arruda and Dr.
Delong needed to disclose whether they were familiar with the applicable standard and then how
they became familiar with that standard. Hr' g Tr. 25 :3-25: 12. Since they failed to disclose this,
their testimony is irrelevant and was thus precluded. Id.
In its written Order, it found that the Leppers' disclosure failed to include that Nurse
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Anuda and Dr. Delong had actual knowledge of the applicable standard of practice and that the
Leppers were required to disclose all testimony which would establish those experts' competency
to testify. See R. Vol. 3, p. 188-189. It reasoned that since their disclosures did not affirmatively
show their knowledge of the local standard of practice and how they obtained that knowledge,
their testimony is irrelevant. Id. at 189.
The com1, in its discretion, decided not to allow the witnesses to testify due to their
inadequate disclosures. See R. Vol. 3, p. 188; Hr'g Tr. 23:20-26:6. It recognized that the purpose
of the scheduling order, as it pertains to expert witness disclosures. is to allow everyone time to
prepare for trial. }lr'g Tr. 23:21-24. Accordingly, the court acted within the boundaries of its
discretion by excluding the experts. Further, it acted consistently with legal standards, as case law
establishes that opinions are not opinions unless they contain the requisite foundation.
3.

The District Court Reached its Decision by an Exercise of Reason

The district court exercised reason in reaching its decision. ·'The role of this Court, in
determining if the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason, is to review the
process the district court engaged in to make its decision."' Palmer v. Spain, 138 Idaho 798,
801-02, 69 P.3d 1059, 1062-63 (2003). The district court considered the facts of the case, the
procedural posture, the parties' arguments, and the applicable standards oflaw before ruling on the
Motion in Limine. It disclosed the reasoning in discussions with counsel on December 3, 2013.
The court advised counsel that the Order required the Leppers to make a prima facie
showing and further:
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rm looking at the testimony of Arruda and DeLong and saying none of [it is]
relevant because they haven't made the nexus between the standard of eare and
their opinions.
Hr·g Tr. 15:1-15:4. Dec. 3, 2013.
Further. in the court's oral ruling it held that a witness's familiarity '·with the local standard
of care and ... how they became familiar with the local standard of care [are] two critical pieces
[ofl testimony in a medical malpractice case.'' Hr'g Tr. 25:8-25:10. Dec. 3, 2013. The court
further held. '·I think the case law is pretty clear and the statute is what it is. That testimony is not
relevant, it's not going to be allowed. and the testimony is precluded." Id. at 25:18-25:20.
This was a reasoned decision, thus satisfying the third part of the Sun Valley test.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in granting the Defendants· Motion in
Limine. Therefore. the trial court's broad discretion should not be disturbed. Further. since there is
not a clear showing of abuse, the court's exercise of discretion should not be overturned. See Sun

Valley. 139 Idaho 76 L 768.
B.

The District Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Granting Dr.
Marano's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's December 5, 2013
Order.

On December 5, 2013, the Court issued its Order on Motion for Reconsideration. Etc. R.
Vol. 3, pp. 205-206.
The district court found that "opinions and conclusions" necessarily incorporate §§ 6-1012
and 6-1013; however, the court allowed the Leppers fourteen (14) days to establish what their
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experts knew. 4
On December 19, 2013, Dr. Marano joined EIRMCs Motion for Reconsideration of the
court's December 5, 2013 Order. R. Vol. 5. pat 734 W. A hearing was held on the Motion on
January 10. 2014. Hr'g Tr. 57. Jan. 10, 2014. The court granted the Motion on January 14, 2014
stating that it should have enforced the amended scheduling order. R. Vol. 6, p. 767.
When deciding a motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same
standard of review that it applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. See

Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho at 276, 281 P.3d at 113 (2012). In other words, if the original
order was a matter within the trial court's discretion, then so is the decision to grant or deny the
motion for reconsideration. Id. The trial court must consider any new admissible evidence;
however, a motion for reconsideration does not have to be supported by new evidence. Id.

In the instant case, the original order was a matter within the trial court's discretion, as it
was an order extending time to comply with its scheduling order. Therefore, the standard ofreview
for the trial court in deciding whether to grant or deny the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration
was also an abuse of discretion standard. Since the decision was within the trial court's discretion,
this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard as well. See Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho at
276,281 P.3d at 113.
1.

4

The District Court Correctly Perceived its Decision Whether to Grant
the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's December
5, 2013 Order as a Discretionary One.

Please see R. Vol. 3, pp. 204-206 for the court's entire Order.
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The court correctly perceived its decision whether to grant the Defendants· Motion for
Reconsideration as a discretionary decision. and this is evident in its statements at the hearing on
the Motion in which it engaged in a conversation with EIRMC's counsel, Mr. Smith, and said the
following referring to its December 5, 2013 Order:
!low do you reach that conclusion? I mean, it seems discretionary to
me. I mean, how do you say that where I make a decision about
extending a deadline, that's a controlling question oflaw?"
Hr'g Tr. 62:17-63:7. Jan. 10, 2014.
Accordingly. the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, thereby
satisfying the first step of this Court's inquiry under the Sun Valley test.

2.

The District Court Acted Within the Outer Boundaries of Its
Discretion and Consistent With Legal Standards.

The court acted vvithin the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistent with legal
standards. The reasoning of the court as indicated by the language of the court's decision as well as
the transcript of the hearing on the motion show that the court properly acted within the outer
bounds of its discretion. See R. Vol. 6, p. 768; Hr'g Tr. Jan. 10, 2014.
In its decision. the court stated that it had previously believed that perhaps the Leppers
inadvertently failed to adequately disclose their experts' opinions and conclusions. R. Vol. 6, p.
768. At the time it allowed the Leppers more time to disclose their experts, the court was under the
impression that Arruda and Dr. DeLong had already met the foundational requirements (and thus
had developed opinions and conclusions), but for some reason the Leppers' counsel had failed to
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put this information in their expert witness disclosure. Id. The courf s belief was based on
statements made at the objection hearing on December 3, 2013.' Id.
In its decision on the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, the court acknowledged
that it based its prior decision to grant the Leppers additional time to disclose their experts on its
mistaken belief that the experts had already adequately familiarized themselves with the
applicable standard of health care practice. Id. It mistakenly believed that the experts had
developed op1mons and conclusions including the requisite foundation and that the Leppers
merely unintentionally failed to disclose these by the deadline. R. Vol. 6, p. 768.
The trial court granted the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration because its original
decision was based on a mistake of fact. Id. Further, the trial court did not believe that the Leppers
had shown good cause as to why their experts had failed to become familiar with the applicable
standard of practice by the October 30, 2013 deadline. Id. Allowing additional time to the Leppers
defeated the purpose of the scheduling order. Id.
In its Order, the court held:
Again, in reconsideration the Court believes it should have enforced its scheduling
order. There was no good basis for extending time for Plaintiffs' experts to
become familiar with a local standard of care. As such, Defendants' motion for
reconsideration is granted. Because the testimony of Arruda and DeLong as
disclosed pursuant to the scheduling order did not include a familiarity with the
local standard of care, their testimony is irrelevant and they will be precluded from
5
Although not explicitly stated by the trial court in its Order, the trial court was likely
referring to Mr. Barton's statement "Now, I can represent to you as an officer of the Court that
these people would not give opinions that they weren't prepared foundationally to back up and do
it properly." Hr'g Tr. 13:8-13:10, Dec. 3, 2013.
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testifying.
R. Vol. 6. pp. 768-770 (emphasis added).
The trial court had discretion to enlarge the time allowed for the Leppers to properly
disclose their witnesses. See I.R.C.P. 6(a). It also had discretion to reconsider its original decision
allowing more time based upon a clarification of the facts upon which it originally relied when it
extended the deadline. In reaching its decision, the trial court considered that the Leppers never
requested an extension of time for their disclosure deadline prior to the original October 30
deadline. See R. Vol. 6, p. 767. Moreover, the trial court also considered the purpose of its
scheduling order and how it was supposed to prevent the very issue that was before the court. Id. In
short, the court determined that it should have enforced its scheduling order, and there was no good
reason for it not to do so. Id.
Accordingly, the court acted within the boundaries of its discretion, consistent with
applicable legal standards.

3.

The District Court Reached its Decision by an Exercise of Reason.

The court identified and applied reasoning behind its decision to grant the Defendants'
Motion for Reconsideration. See R. Vol. 6, p. 768; Hr'g Tr. Jan. 10, 2014. It explained that it
originally granted the Lcppers additional time to disclose their experts because it believed that the
experts were competent and had opinions and conclusions to disclose by October 30 and those
opinions and conclusions were merely left out of the expert witness disclosure for some reason.
See R. Vol. 6, p. 768. It explained that it believed, based on statements made by the Leppers'
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counsel. that the experts had opinions and conclusions that could be backed up with adequate
foundation and that all counsel needed to do was put that foundation in writing. Id. In recognizing
that the Leppers' experts had not in fact adequately familiarized themselves with the applicable
standard of practice, the court explained why it believed that there was no good cause as to why the
Leppers had not complied with the scheduling order. Id. One of the reasons is that the Leppers,
prior to the deadline, never asked for an expert witness disclosure deadline extension. Id.
Since the court acted within its discretion, consistent with legal standards, and reached its
decision rationally, there is no clear showing of abuse, the trial couri's discretionary decision to
grant the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration should not be disturbed.

C.

The District Court Properly Granted Dr. Marano's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

On February 14, 2014, the court issued its Order on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider 6 and
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. R. Vol. 8. p. 2013. The couri denied the Leppers'
Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Id.
Regarding the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment the court determined that the
Leppers could not make out a primafacie case without the testimony of their experts Nurse Arruda
and Dr. Delong, and those experts were properly excluded. Id. at 1208. The court determined that
regardless whether A1Tuda may now have an opinion on the applicable standard of health care

6
The Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider was a motion for reconsideration of the court's
January 14, 2014 Order in which it granted the Defendants' motions for reconsideration
precluding Dr. Delong and Nurse Arruda. Essentially, the Leppers were asking the court to
reconsider its decision to preclude its experts.
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practice. that opinion is inconsequential since it was not properly disclosed by the deadline. R. Vol.
8. p. 1205. Further. regarding Dr. DeLong. even if Dr. DeLong now believes that the standard of
health care practice applicable to Dr. Marano is indeterminable, his beliefs arc irrelevant since he
never disclosed his opinions and conclusions by the disclosure deadline (which opinions and
conclusions would have included the necessary foundation). Id. at 1206.
The standard of review for this Court in reviewing the trial courf s order granting the
Defendants summary judgment is the same standard of review that the trial court used in originally
ruling on the Motion. See Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 271, 281 P.3d at 108. If all of the pleadings,
admissions on file, depositions, and the affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, a grant of summary judgment is
appropriate. Id.
The court properly granted the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment because there
was no genuine issue of material fact. and both of the Defendants were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Dulaney v. St. Alpl10nsus Reg'! Med. Ctr. sets out that plaintiffs in a medical
malpractice case must offer expert testimony and this may only be admissible if the plaintiff lays
the foundation required by I.C. § 6-1013. 7
Dulaney v. St. Alpl1011sus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816,820 (2002).

The Com1·s decision in Arregui v. Gallegos-Main is also instructive. See Arregui v.
Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801,291 P.3d 1000 (2012), reh'g denied (June 7, 2012). In that case,

7

Please see Dulaney for the court's full decision.
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the defendant filed a motion for summary j udgrnent arguing that the plaintiff had failed to present
expert testimony establishing the local standard of care and thus had failed to submit evidence that
the defendant doctor breached the applicable standard of practice. Id. at 803, 1002. The plaintiff
filed a brief in opposition as well as an affidavit from her expert witness stating that she was now
familiar with the applicable standard of practice. Id. The defendant filed a motion to strike the
affidavit arguing that it was untimely filed according to Rule 56( c) and that it failed to satisfy the
foundation requirements in Rule 56(e) and I.C. § 6-1013. Id.
The court in Arregui affirmed the trial courf s decisions striking the expert's affidavit and
granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. See Arregui, 153 Idaho at 804,291 P.3d
at 1033. It stated that "The admissibility of expert testimony, however, is a threshold matter that is
distinct from whether the testimony raises genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude
summary judgment." Id. at 804, 1003. It first determined that the lower court did not abuse its
discretion in striking the plaintiff's expert's affidavit. as it was untimely filed according to Rule
56(c). Id. Further, the lower court did not err in granting the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. Id. The lower court analyzed the motion for summary judgment based on the expert's
deposition testimony, and the court did not consider the untimely filed affidavit in which the expert
stated that she was now adequately familiar with the applicable standard of health care practice. Id.
The court properly granted the defendants' motion since the expert did not testify in her deposition
that she was familiar with the applicable standard of practice. Id. Since she had failed to meet the
foundational requirements, she did not have the requisite opinion to defeat the defendant's motion
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for summary judgment. Id.
Similar to the court in Arregui, the court in the present matter correctly granted the
Defendants· motion for summary judgment based on the affidavits and pleadings that were timely
filed. The court was allowed to disregard the substance of the Leppers· untimely filed affidavits.
When the Leppers filed affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the court had
discretion to refuse to consider these opinions in deciding whether to grant the Defendants·
motion. The court acted within its discretion in issuing its scheduling order and requiring the
parties to abide by it. The court properly determined the threshold question of the admissibility of
the Leppers' experts' testimony. Since this threshold matter is distinct from whether the testimony
raised a genuine issue of material fact, the court acted properly in not considering the alleged
opinions in the experts' affidavits filed in opposition to the motion. Since Arruda and Dr.
DeLong's testimony was excluded, the Leppers could not make out aprimafacie case. They could
not establish that the Defendants breached the applicable standard of practice since their experts
did not even have actual knowledge of that standard. Thus, there was no genuine issue of material
fact. and the Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.
The Leppers argue that the district court erred in granting the Motion for Summary
Judgment because the court ignored the affidavits and affidavit testimony that they presented to
support their Motion for Reconsideration and to oppose the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. Appellants' Br. 23. The Leppers misinterpret the court's actions. The comi reviewed
the affidavits that the Leppers filed, and this is evident by its written decision. R. Vol. 8, p.
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1205-1206. The court was not surprised that Nurse Arruda now had some opinions. but this did not
change the deadline. R. Vol. 8. p. 1205-1206. As to Dr. De Long. the court's position was that the
leppers' position relative to indeterminability and admissible opinion testimony of a similar
community needed to be produced by October 30, 2013. R. Vol. 8, p. 1205. Regardless, Dr.
Delong was not familiar with the standard of practice in a similar community in Idaho as required
by statute, and Dr. Delong was of the opinion that the standard of practice in Billings satisfied that
requirement. R. Vol. 8, pp. 1205-1206. The court had previously excluded Arruda and Dr.
DeLong's testimony, and it properly exercised its discretion in doing so. Id. As such. the court
properly refused to consider new testimony from witnesses who had been previously excluded. Id.
D.

The District Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Denying the Leppers'
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order of January 14, 2014.

On January 14, 2014, the court granted the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of the
court's December 5, 2013 Order in which the court extended the Leppers' expert witness
disclosure deadlines. R. Vol. 6. p. 767. One week later. the leppers moved the court to reconsider
its January 14 Order. R. Vol. 6. p. 789. The court denied the Leppers · Motion for Reconsideration
on February 14, 2014. R. Vol. 8, p. 1203.
In ruling on leppers' Motion for Reconsideration of the court's Order of January 14, 2014,
the court recognized its discretion, acted properly and within the bounds of legal authority, and
applied reason to its decision.

1.

The District Court Correctly Perceived its Decision Whether to Grant
the Leppers' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's January 14,
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2014 Order as a Discretionary One.
The court correctly perceived its decision whether to grant the Leppers· Motion for
Reconsideration as discretionary. See R. Vol. 8. p. 1203-1208. The court stated that '·in cases such
as this where there is a scheduling order with disclosure deadlines. the disclosure must be in
compliance with the scheduling order.'' R. Vol. 8, p. 1205. The court went on to state that it had
repeatedly referenced its policy regarding scheduling orders "in promoting an orderly march
towards trial and avoiding eleventh hour challenges to witnesses, testimony, etc:· Id. Although the
court did not explicitly state that it recognized its decision as discretionary, its language indicates
that it perceived the decision as discretionary. See Van, 147 Idaho at 560. 212 P.3d at 990.
Accordingly. the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, thereby satisfying
the first step of this Court's inquiry.

2.

The District Court Acted Within the Outer Boundaries of Its
Discretion and Consistent With Legal Standards.

In its decision, the court reiterated that the Leppers were required under the scheduling
order to timely disclose their experts· opinions and conclusions which necessarily included the
required foundation for those opinions and conclusions. R. Vol. 8, p. 1204. It explained that the
Leppers' argument that they were not required to disclose that their experts were familiar with the
local standard of practice was untenable. Id. at 1205. Had the Leppers not been required to disclose
this foundation by the disclosure deadline, the Defendants would be unable to conduct discovery
as to Dr. DeLong and Arruda's familiarity and would be unable to prepare rebuttal testimony. Id.
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Further. even if the local standard of practice as to Dr. Marano was indeterminable. the Leppers
were still required to establish that Dr. DeLong was familiar with the standard of practice in a
similar Idaho community. Id. In sum. the Leppers failed to timely and adequately disclose their
experts by the deadline; therefore, their Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Id.
The Leppers argue that they demonstrated good cause to support their Motion for
Reconsideration, and the court abused its discretion by refusing to consider the experts' testimony
submitted in support of the Motion. Appellants' Br. 24. A "court should take into consideration
any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the interlocutory
order." See Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,472.147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct. App. 2006). Here,
however, the court stated that it would not consider affidavits or disclosures filed after the original
expert witness disclosure deadline of October 30.2013. Id. It determined that "[t]estimony that is
precluded from trial cannot be used to preclude summary judgment." R. Vol. 8, p. 1208.
The Leppers complain that while the district court afforded them an opportunity to submit
affidavits in support of their second motion for reconsideration (seeking reconsideration of the
district court's January 14, 2014, Order) and in opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment it should have considered the inadmissible affidavit testimony of Arruda and Dr.
DeLong. See Appellants' Br. 34. However, such a position is untenable. It is undisputed that in
its January 14, 2014 Order. the court held that Anuda·s and Dr. DeLong's testimony "is irrelevant
and they will be precluded from testifying." R. Vol. 6, p. 770. Thus, Arruda and Dr. DeLong
were precluded from testifying by affidavit or otherwise in the case.
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Idaho appellate courts have held that the only material considered in a motion for summary
judgment or reconsideration arc materials that would be admissible at trial. See Ryan v. Beisner.
123 Idaho 42. 45. 844 P.2d 24, 27 (Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added).
In addition, this Court has held''[ o ]n a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider
any new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order.''

Fragnella. 153 Idaho at 276, 281 P.3d at 113 ( emphasis added).

Therefore. pursuant to its

January 14. 2014 Order and Idaho case law, the court was correct in not considering the
inadmissible affidavit testimony that was submitted in support of the Leppers' second motion for
reconsideration and in opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. The decision
should be upheld on appeal.

3.

The District Court Reached its Decision by an Exercise of Reason.

The court considered the facts of the case, the procedural posture, the parties' arguments,
and the applicable standards of law before it ruled on the Motion. R. Vol. 8. pp. 1203-1208. There
is no clear showing of an abuse of discretion, the district court's decision denying the Leppers'
Motion should not be disturbed on appeal.

E.

The District Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Denying Plaintiffs'
Motion for Reconsideration of the Final Judgment Entered on February 14,
2014.

On February 14, 2014, the trial court granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. R. Vol. 8, p. 1203. On the same date, the court entered a final judgment under I.R.C.P.
54. R. Vol. 8, p. 1210. On February 28, 2104, the Leppers filed a Motion to Reconsider the court's
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final judgment. R. Vol. 8, p. 1268. The court denied the Leppers' Motion on March 14. 2014. R.
Vol. 8, p. 1302.
1.

The District Court Correctly Perceived its Decision Whether to Grant
the Leppers' Motion for Reconsideration of the Final .Judgment
Entered on February 14, 2014 as a Discretionary One.

The court's written Order establishes that it correctly perceived its decision whether to
grant the Motion as a discretionary decision. R. Vol. 8, pp. 1302-1304. In its decision, the court
stated that it recognized the seriousness of the issues, it gave the matter a great deal of deliberation
and thought, and it fully considered the issues and applicable law. Id.
2.

The District Court Acted Within the Outer Boundaries of Its
Discretion and Consistent With Legal Standards.

In its written Order, the court explained its reasoning behind its decision. R. Vol. 8, pp.
1302-1304. The court stated that Rule 11(a)(2)(B) and case law prohibit parties from seeking
reconsideration of a final judgment under Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B). Id. at 1302. Although the cou1i found
that Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) was not the appropriate authority to use in a motion for reconsideration of its
final judgment, the court nonetheless considered the Motion under Rule 59( e). Id. at 1302-1303.
The court found that even in considering the Motion under Rule 59( e), it still could not grant the
Leppers' Motion. Id. Rule 59( e) does not allow the court to consider new evidence. Id. The court
went on to find that even without considering the new evidence (the affidavits), it still could not
grant the Motion. Id. Simply put, the testimony of Arruda and Delong were previously excluded,
and the court, after giving "the matter a great deal of deliberation," still did not find a valid basis to
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alter or amend its final judgment under Ruic 59(e). Id.
The court. in its discretion. decided not to reconsider, alter. or amend its final judgment. Id.
The court was correct in refusing to consider the new affidavits. as new evidence is not allowed to
support a Rule 59(e) Motion. 8 See Johnson. 143 Idaho at 472, 147 P.3d at 104 n. 3 (Because
Rule 59( e) motions are brought after judgment, new evidence may not be presented with such
motions."').
Even if this Court determines that the Leppers' Motion was properly brought under Rule
11 (a)(2)(B), and therefore new evidence was allowed to be considered by the lower court. the
lower courf s decision is still proper.
This Court has held ··[ o ]n a motion for reconsideration. the court must consider any new
admissible evidence or authority bearing on the c01Tectness of an interlocutory order."

Fragnella. 153 Idaho at 276 281 P.3d at 113 (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the district
court ordered that Arruda and Dr. Delong were precluded from testifying.

R. Vol. 6, p. 770.

Thus, there is no question that the affidavit/declaration testimony of Arruda and Dr. Delong in
support of their third motion for reconsideration (seeking reconsideration of the district court's
February 14, 2014. Order) were inadmissible because they had been precluded from testifying.
Accordingly, the court was correct in not considering inadmissible evidence submitted in support
of the Leppers · Motion for Reconsideration.

"A motion for reconsideration under Rule l 1(a)(2)(B) only applies to orders made before
8
and after the entry of a final judgment, not to the final ,judgment itself." See Shelton v. Shelton,
148 Idaho 560, 566, 225 P.3d 693, 699 n. 4 (2009) (emphasis added).
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In addition, the present matter is distinguishable from the facts and circumstances present
in Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 16L 166, 158 P.3d 937,942 (2007) cited to by the Leppers. See
Appellants' Br. 35-37. Unlike in this case, there is no mention in Puckett that the district court's
scheduling order included a provision that required a responding party to make objections to an
opposing party's expert witness disclosures or waive any such objections. This distinction is
crucial because as the district court noted in its February 14, 2014 Order on Plaintiffs' Motion to
Reconsider, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment: "Additionally, the purpose of the
scheduling order was not to require Defendants to identify the defects of a witness disclosure and
then allow Plaintiffs additional time to attempt to cure the defects." R. Vol. 8, p. 1207. If the
Leppcrs were allowed to cure the defects that Defendants were required to point out, then the
district court's scheduling order would be rendered meaningless.
Further in Puckett there is no indication that the district court entered an order
precluding/prohibiting plaintiffs' experts from testifying, as was the case here.
The district court made clear ''the purpose of the scheduling order was to require full
disclosure of anticipated testimony and allow the opposing party time to prepare for it." R. Vol.
8, p. 1207. "The purpose of the order was also to preclude a flurry of motions shortly before trial
regarding expert witnesses, challenging testimony, and motions seeking additional time." Id.
The Leppers' expert witness disclosure, including all opinions and conclusions were due by
October 30, 2013.

The Leppers exclusively relied upon inadmissible affidavit/declaration

testimony in support of their Third Motion for Reconsideration. Consistent with Idaho case law,
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the court did not consider the inadmissible affidavit/declaration testimony. and the district courf s
March 14. 2014 Order denying the Leppers · Motion for Reconsideration should be affirmed.

3.

The District Court Reached its Decision by an Exercise of Reason.

The court considered the facts of the case. the procedural posture. the parties· arguments.
and the applicable standards of law before it ruled on the Motion. R. Vol. 8. pp. 1302-1304. There
is no clear showing of an abuse of discretion, the court's decision denying the Leppers' Motion
should not be disturbed on appeal.
Even if one were to assume that the court erred in its final judgment/motion for
reconsideration analysis in this case, it does not obviate the Leppers' real problem, which is that
their third motion for reconsideration relied entirely upon inadmissible affidavit/declaration
testimony.

The court clearly recognized this in its March 14, 2014 Order wherein it stated:

The Court previously ruled that the testimony of Plaintiffs. experts was
inadmissible. The Court then concluded that that same inadmissible testimony
could not be used to preclude summary judgment.
R. Vol. 8. p. 1303.
Thus. even assummg for purposes of argument only that the court erred in its final
judgment/motion for reconsideration analysis, the end result is the same and this Corni may affirm
the district court. albeit on different grounds. See Miles v. Idaho Power Company, 116 Idaho
635,637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989).

F.

Even if this Court Considers the Entirety of Plaintiffs' Efforts to Establish
Foundation for their Experts to Testify, as such Existed on October 30, 2013,
those Efforts cannot be read to Defeat Summary Judgment or Motion(s) for
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Reconsideration.
Even assuming this Court finds that the trial court abused its discretion and should have
considered what the Leppers' experts knew but did not disclose as to opinions and conclusions
about the standard of practice on October 30, 2013. that information was not sufficient to defeat
the Motion for Summary Judgment or grant a Motion for Reconsideration. so the exclusion was
harmless.
As of October 30, 2013, the sum total of the leppers' efforts to familiarize Dr. Delong
with the applicable standard of health care practice was:
1)

October 8, 2013 letters to Idaho Falls neurosurgeons Robert Cach, M.D and Clark
Allen, M.D., asking them for help in a cardiology case. Drs. Cach and Allen are
asked to talk with Plaintiffs' out-ofstate expert.

R. Vol. 4, p. 283 and 287. It is

not known who this would be, as Dr. Delong lived in Orofino. It is not known
what Drs. Cach and Allen made of this strange request.
2)

An October 8, 2013 letter to Idaho Falls neurosurgeon Brent Greenwald, M.D.
asking Dr. Greenwald for his assistance '·as a local neurologist," to talk with an
out-of-state expert. R. Vol. 4, p. 284. It is not known what Dr. Greenwald made
of this request.

3)

October 11, 2013 letters to Ors. Walker and Kelley of Blackfoot, [daho asking for
assistance talking to an out-of-state expert about the local standard of care in Idaho
Falls. R. Vol. 4, pp. 289-290.
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4)

An October 11, 2013 letter to Dr. William Huneycutt. M.D. ofldaho Falls, asking
Dr. Huneycutt to discuss the neurosurgery standard of care with an out-of-state
expert. R. Vol. 4, p. 291.

9

While the leppers' attorney says that he asked these individuals to talk with Dr. Delong,
there is nothing to support this. R. Vol. 4, p. 276.
In fact, there is nothing in the record that Dr. Delong gave any consideration to obtaining
actual knowledge of the applicable standard of practice before October 30. 2013. His self-serving
December 17, 2013 letter, in which he asserts that "the neurosurgeons ofidaho" will not respond
to his overtures, does not specify what the overtures where, and most imp011antly, when they were
made. R. Vol. 5, p. 734 UUUUU. Importantly, in this letter, Dr. Delong seems to indicate that
his discussions with counsel about the availability of a neurosurgeon to talk to him came after
October 30, as he says that the leppers' attorneys advised him that they had sent letters to '"each
neurosurgeon'' and that the lawyers advised him that [the neurosurgeons] would not talk with [Dr.
DeLong].

R. Vol. 5, p. 734 UUUUU. The serial letter writing began in earnest after December

3. 2013.
Even assuming this Court was to agree that the leppers' counsel believed, as of October
30, 2013, that the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Marano was indetenninable, there is

9
The parties agree that the other neurosurgeons in Idaho Falls in 2010 were Ors. Cach,
Greenwald, Huneycutt and Allen. R.. Vol. 5, pp. 734 MMMM - 734 RRRR and R. Vol. 4, p. 602.
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nothing in the record to support that this was so.
First, unlike in Paugh and Hoene Drs. Greenwald, Cach, Huneycutt and Allen were not in
a professional association with Dr. Marano. R. Vol. 5, pp. 734 MMMM - 734 RRRR; see Hoene
v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 752, 828 P.2d 315 ( 1992). ; Paugh v. Ottman, CV-07-39-S-BL W, 2008 WL

2704561, *6 (D. Idaho July 3, 2008).
Second, even if the Leppers' submission about The Doctors Hospital stands for the
proposition that the physicians who provided neurosurgery there in 2014 are to be considered one
physician, as of 2010, there is no evidence that Dr. Cach was a principal.
Third, no effo1is were undertaken to communicate with an orthopedic spine surgeon from
Idaho Falls, Idaho about the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Marano, despite the Leppers'
late acknowledgement that that may be so, as witnessed by the serial letters to orthopedic spine
surgeons.
Even assuming this Court were to agree that no other spine surgeon in Idaho Falls, Idaho
could have actual knowledge of the standard of health care practice applicable to Dr. Marano, and
that Dr. Cach was somehow incapable of communicating information about the standard of health
care practice to Dr. DeLong, and that therefore the standard of health care practice is
indetenninable, there is nothing in the record to support that the Leppers inquired of other Idaho
physicians about the standard of practice in their communities.
Idaho Code § 6-1012 is clear as to when evidence of a standard of practice in a similar
Idaho community may be considered for purposes of obtaining actual knowledge of the standard
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of health care practice and that is only ''[i]f there be no other like provider in the community.'' See
l.C. § 6-1012.
There is only one Idaho appellate comi case which addresses the issue of indeterminability.

See Hoene, 121 Idaho 752, 828 P.2d 315. There, the Supreme Court reversed the trial comi's
granting of summary judgment in Dr. Barnes' favor arguing that since Dr. Barnes was a
cardiovascular surgeon and the only other health care providers in this class were Dr. Barnes'
partners, the standard of practice in the community ordinarily served by St. Luke's was
indeterminable. Id. at 754, 317
In the matter at bar, there are at least four other neurosurgeons who had a practice in the
community ordinarily served by EIRMC in 2010. Further, the Leppers admit, through their later
filings, that the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Marano, could be known by orthopedic spine
surgeons, and they did nothing to obtain this information. Therefore, there is no appellate law in
the state of Idaho that allows for the Leppers to argue indeterminability in a situation like this.
Similarly, in a U.S. District Court case, Judge Winmill determined that since Drs. Rau and
Truska were in the same group of radiologists as the only other radiologists in Nampa, the
radiologists in Nampa were considered one provider. See Paugh v. Ottman, CV-07-39-S-BLW,
2008 WL 2704561, *6 (D. Idaho July 3, 2008).
Idaho law therefore does not consider that the standard of practice in Idaho Falls as to Dr.
Marano is indeterminable.
Even assuming this Court were to find that the Leppers actually made an effort to
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familiarize Dr. Delong with the applicable standard of care

the through numerous,

incomprehensible and untimely letters to Ors. Cach, Greenwald, Allen and Huneycutt and nothing
to any orthopedic spine surgeons

and that the standard of practice applicable to Dr. Marano was

indeterminable, thus allowing them to look to another [daho community. They did not.
As of October 30.2013 the Leppers had completely failed to attempt to determine if there
was a physician from a ·'similar'' community to Idaho Falls who would talk to Dr. Delong about
the applicable standard of health care practice in that community. 10
With respect to Nurse Arruda, there is nothing in the record establishing that any attempt
was made to familiarize her with the applicable standard of health care practice. Her first attempt
at making such inquiry seems to be a December 9, 2013 telephone call. R. Vol. 5, 734 DD.
Thus, even if this Court were to determine what was known but "not given," by October
30, 2013, there is nothing in these materials that raises issues of material fact to defend a motion
for summary judgment originally, or on reconsideration.

G.

Respondent Dr. Marano is Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules.

This Court has held that a party is "entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. §
12-121 if this Comi is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or pursued

10
In fact, overlooked in the leppers' latter serial letter writing campaign, was that they never
sent letters to Drs. Garner, Griffiths, Lason, Lee, McCowin, Mills, Redd, Richardson, Stalcup,
Thurman or Woods asking these doctors to speak about their knowledge of a standard of practice
in a community similar to Idaho Falls. R. Vol. 4, 414-425, 424-432, 434-437.
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frivolously. unreasonably. and without foundation:·

Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho I 05.

109-110. 982 P.2d 940, 944 (1999).
A review of the record in this case makes it clear that it was the Appellants· own
oversights. omissions and delays which brought about this appeal.
Dr. Marano does not minimize the fact that the leppers· attorneys faced some difficult
times, but that does not change the fact that Appellants did nothing to secure additional time to
comply with the court's Order that they produce all "opinions and conclusions" of their experts.
The leppers' attempts at satisfying that their experts had admissible opinions and
conclusions came only after the deadline had passed. Presumably, had the leppers believed that
the comi's scheduling order was not sufficient, and that they had not made an error, they would
have attempted an appeal of the court's Order to exclude Dr. Delong and Arruda, or stipulated to
Dr. Marano· s Motion to Dismiss or renewed Motion to Dismiss. R. Vol. 3 p. 211 E; Vol. 7 p.
767A.
Rather. the leppers attempted to show what they did not show before October 30, 2013,
that Arruda and Dr. Delong had actual knowledge of the applicable standards of practice and how
they came to those opinions.
Accordingly, this appeal was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without
foundation. Consequently, Dr. Marano is entitled to his attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The leppers failed to timely and properly disclose their expert witnesses in compliance
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with the district court's scheduling order.

Defendants, as required by the district court's

scheduling order, timely objected to the leppers disclosure and moved for exclusion of Dr.
Delong and Nurse Arruda.
The district court ultimately excluded AITuda and Dr. Delong, which was not an abuse of
discretion.
The district court determined that allowing the leppers' additional time to comply with its
scheduling Order was an error. This decision was not an abuse of discretion.
As the leppers' had not, before the deadline, disclosed experts who could testify regarding
alleged breaches of the applicable standards of health care practice in this case, the district court
appropriately entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
The leppers' motion for reconsideration of the district court's grant of summary judgment
relied upon the inadmissible affidavit/declaration testimony of excluded witnesses An-uda and Dr.
Delong and appropriately said motion was denied by the district court.
Dr. Marano respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's decision to
exclude Arruda and Dr. Delong. affirm the district court's order granting Defendants summary
judgment, affirm the judgment of dismissal, and affirm the district court's denial of the leppers'
Motion for Reconsideration seeking reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment and affirm
the trial court's denial of the leppers' third Motion to Reconsider.
The leppers' position is one of their own making and this appeal 1s brought about
frivolously. As such, Dr. Marano is entitled to costs and fees, on appeal.
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